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INTRODUCTION 
This Symposium comes at a critical juncture for America’s prosecutors. 
One important question—“Is there room for a new kind of prosecutor?”—
has already been answered. Self-styled “progressive prosecutors” are 
flourishing in jurisdictions across the country. The question remains whether 
the progressive prosecutor movement will have a lasting impact and, if so, 
what that impact will be. One way this question will be answered is through 
the movement’s influence on the many prosecutors who are open to reform 
but unlikely to adopt the “progressive” label or accompanying rhetoric. 
This Essay explores this theme by discussing, first, the rise of 
progressive prosecution and, second, how this movement’s initial success 
can stimulate the long-overdue development of a generally applicable, 
normative theory of the prosecutor’s role. It suggests a conceptualization of 
the American prosecutor as a caretaker for the criminal justice system, who 
should default to lenience when that system becomes so congested and 
punitive that it cannot deliver on its constitutional ideals. 
I. THE RISE OF THE PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTOR 
Two societal trends are key ingredients in the rise of the progressive 
prosecutor: (1) a growing recognition of the problem of mass incarceration, 
 
* Professor, William & Mary Law School. Thanks to Sydney Black, Patrick Blood, Chad 
Flanders, Frances Harvey, and Stephen Galoob for organizing and coordinating this 
Symposium. This Essay summarizes the author’s ‘Lunch Keynote’ address at the Symposium. 
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and (2) a gradual downward trend in crime. These two factors feed an 
emerging consensus that severe penal policies are unwarranted, if not 
immoral. Critics attack both the system’s motives and its competence.1 
Progressives are not alone. Conservatives, too, criticize the penal system as 
a massive government program with unclear goals and questionable claims 
to success.2 
In a democracy, local elections are the natural place to direct popular 
energy. While a desire for criminal justice reform could reasonably be 
channeled toward electing legislators or state judges, some organizers focus 
on another target—district attorneys. 
District attorney races offer a rare bargain in the money-fueled arms 
race of American politics. District attorney elections are characterized by low 
voter interest.3 Candidates regularly run unopposed.4 In some jurisdictions it 
is difficult to find anyone willing to take the job.5 This plays to two strengths 
of progressive reformers: (1) a passionate voter base and (2) access to 
campaign financing from wealthy donors like George Soros.6 Strategic 
infusions of campaign funds allow reform challengers with a progressive 
message to mobilize like-minded voters and oust incumbent district 
attorneys. 
 
1 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2012) (framing the criminal 
justice system as a continuation of historical racism); Making a Murderer, NETFLIX, 
https://www.netflix.com/title/80000770 (raising questions about convictions); Serial, NPR, 
Season 1, https://serialpodcast.org/season-one [https://perma.cc/W5GC-38BJ], (suggesting 
that Adnan Syed was wrongfully convicted); Serial, NPR, Season 3, https://serialpodcast.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/676U-XJ2L]; (reporting on chaotic criminal courts in Cleveland). 
https://www.netflix.com/title/80000770 [https://perma.cc/V5G4-5GRP]. 
 2 Arthur Rizer & Lars Trautman, The Conservative Case for Criminal Justice Reform, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/05/the-conser
vative-case-for-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/J2VG-EGU5]. 
 3 Bidish Sarma, Using Deterrence Theory to Promote Prosecutorial Accountability, 
21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 573, 592 (2017) (“Prosecutorial elections are historically low-
information, low-turnout affairs.”). 
 4 See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 
591 (2009). 
 5 See Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 
1537, 1544–46 (2020). 
 6 Justin Jouvenal & Rachel Weiner, Money from PAC Funded by George Soros Shakes 
Up Prosecutor Races in Northern Virginia, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2019, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/money-from-pac-funded-by-george-
soros-shakes-up-prosecutors-races-in-northern-virginia/2019/04/23/5c754d14-6513-11e9-
a1b6-b29b90efa879_story.html [https://perma.cc/9ZT8-Q6AF] (“Soros-aligned PACs have 
given heavily to local prosecutor races across the country in recent years, helping tip contests 
to reformist Democratic candidates in Philadelphia, Chicago, Houston and elsewhere.”); 
Hessick & Morse, supra note 5, at 1540 (“[A] motivated group of advocates and their 
supporters have started a movement to elect progressive prosecutors.”). 
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Apart from the political advantages noted in the preceding paragraph, 
there are structural reasons reformers target district attorneys, as opposed to 
judges, police, or legislators. District attorneys have no boss. They answer 
solely to the voters. This means that District Attorneys do not need to clear 
their policies with other officials. They can act unilaterally. By contrast, 
conservative and progressive legislators must often compromise to pass laws. 
Trial courts, in turn, are checked by appellate courts, which themselves 
require compromise in order to generate a controlling opinion. Police chiefs, 
another powerful source of reform, are similar to district attorneys with 
respect to local independence. But police chiefs in large cities are generally 
not elected.7 And the mayors who appoint chiefs are often multi-issue 
candidates running in broadly contested elections.8 
Reformers also tapped into decades of hyperbolic scholarly 
commentary on prosecutors.9 The scholarly conversation began with famous 
rhetorical flourishes highlighting the once-overlooked importance of 
prosecutorial discretion.10 Building on this rhetoric, modern scholarly 
commentary reached a head-turning crescendo. Scholars regularly suggest 
that prosecutors are the most powerful actors in the criminal justice universe, 
if not the sole drivers of criminal justice policy.11 Reformers astutely 
capitalize on this rhetoric to motivate progressive funders and voters to focus 
on district attorney elections.12 
The distinctive political and structural factors described above explain 
reformers’ focus on electing prosecutors. District attorneys are single-topic 
candidates competing in low-turnout elections who, once elected, can act 
unilaterally albeit in narrow jurisdictional spheres. Overheated scholarly 
rhetoric on prosecutorial power was just icing on the cake. It likely does not 
matter to the political actors driving the movement that prosecutors (writ 
 
 7 Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 741 (2020) 
(“While police chiefs are somewhat democratically accountable—most are appointed by their 
mayors or a board of other elected officials.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Mitch Smith, Lori Lightfoot, Chicago’s Incoming Mayor, Ran on Outsider 
Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/us/chicago-mayor-
lori-lightfoot.html [https://perma.cc/A4WT-SA5U] (describing issues in 2019 Chicago Mayor 
race, including education, political corruption, crime, economic development, and income 
inequality). 
 9 See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (2019) 
(documenting hyperbolic commentary) [hereinafter Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors]; 
Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (illustrating the connection between commentary and the reform movement) 
[hereinafter Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution]. 
 10 Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 9, at 178, 187–88. 
 11 Id. at 187–88. 
 12 See Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, supra note 9, at 3. 
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large) are the fourth most powerful criminal justice actors, trailing 
legislatures (#1), police (#2), and judges (#3). Daniel Fryer’s contribution to 
the Symposium takes up this question in more detail, reaching similar, if 
distinct, conclusions.13 If reformers could, they would happily pick any—or 
all—of these powerful potential sources of reform. But District Attorneys in 
cities with large progressive populations are low hanging fruit. 
Importantly, fourth-most powerful is still quite powerful.14 In addition, 
the distinctive power that prosecutors possess—the power to let people go—
maps nicely onto portions of the progressive agenda.15 There is no question 
that reform-minded prosecutors can influence the criminal justice system. 
Recognizing the limits on prosecutor power is nevertheless important to 
evaluating the long-term impact of progressive prosecution. While typically 
unable to directly overrule a prosecutor’s decisions, judges, legislators, 
governors, and police can still check prosecutors in a variety of ways.16 As I 
have written elsewhere, “it takes a village” to send someone to prison and 
even prosecutorial leniency can be undermined by police, legislators, and 
judges.17 In addition, the populist energy that enabled the swift rise of 
progressive prosecutors could also bring about their downfall. If crime spikes 
again or politics shift for other reasons, voters may become less receptive to 
progressive prosecution, even in liberal jurisdictions.18 Similarly, competing 
 
 13 See Daniel Fryer, Race, Reform & Progressive Prosecution, 110 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 769 (2020). 
14 14 See David Ewalt, The World’s Most Powerful People 2018, FORBES (May 8, 2018, 7:02 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewalt/2018/05/08/the-worlds-most-powerful-peopl
e-2018/#6029bc836c47 [https://perma.cc/FCQ8-PTYD] (citing that Germany’s Angela 
Merkel was Forbes’ fourth most powerful person in the world in 2018); see also Top 10 List 
of the World’s Strongest Animals, ONEKINDPLANET, https://onekindplanet.org/top-10/top-10-
list-of-the-worlds-strongest-animals/ [https://perma.cc/99CN-WQ9R] (declaring that the 
Gorilla is the world’s fourth strongest animal); Callie Ahlgrim, A Definitive Ranking of All the 
Avengers, from Least to Most Powerful, INSIDER (May 1, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://www.insider
.com/avengers-who-is-the-strongest-after-endgame-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/M8AB-UBQY] 
(asserting that Captain America is the fourth most powerful Avenger). 
 15 See Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass 
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 846 (2018) (reviewing JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE 
TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION: AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017)) 
[hereinafter Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power]. 
 16 Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 9, at 181, 192, 199. 
 17 Id. at 181. 
 18 This volatile mixture of rising crime against a perception of penal leniency appears, for 
example, at the beginning of the era of Mass Incarceration. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF 
THE NAT’L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 46 (2014) 
(describing increasing penal severity against a backdrop of “a large increase in crime from the 
early 1960s until the 1980s”); Jeffrey Bellin, The Changing Role of the American Prosecutor, 
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funding sources may rise in opposition to progressive funders. These 
developments could undo progressive prosecutors’ work. What’s more, the 
heightened politicization of district attorney elections and a new consensus 
about the benefits of enhancing (not reducing) prosecutorial power, could 
remain long after the current wave of progressive prosecutors depart.19 As 
Rebecca Roiphe and Bruce Green’s contribution to this Symposium 
highlights, this is actually the second time progressive prosecutors appeared 
on the landscape.20  While few remember the first wave, which took place 
during the Progressive Era of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, its legacy remains long after the movement disappeared.21 
Even if society’s moods do not shift, there is a danger that progressive 
prosecutors will remain consistently viable only in a discrete minority of 
jurisdictions. Prosecutorial independence is offset by limited, county-specific 
spheres of influence. An emerging dichotomy of American prosecution could 
neutralize prosecutor-driven reform. Urban prosecutors could send fewer 
people to prison, while rural prosecutors send more. Police could accelerate 
this trend by bypassing progressive prosecutors and taking arrests to federal 
prosecutors or seeking out other alternative paths to prosecution.22 
Conservative legislators and judges may react to progressive prosecutors by 
constructing broadly applicable constraints on prosecutorial leniency. 
II. A UNIVERSAL MODEL: PROSECUTORS AS CARETAKERS 
As progressive prosecutors themselves have learned, they can reduce 
backlash with careful framing. Kim Foxx, speaking at this Symposium, 
stressed that she does not see herself as a progressive prosecutor. Building 
on her experience as a line prosecutor,23 Foxx sought the State’s Attorney 
position to ensure that Cook County prosecutes the right way. As this 
 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Bellin, Changing Role] 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3621474 [https://perma.cc/ES93-8JNF] 
(explaining how populist perceptions led to mass incarceration) [hereinafter Bellin, Changing 
Role]. 
 19 Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1251 (2020) (presenting 
similar caution) [hereinafter Bellin, Theories of Prosecution]. 
 20 Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, When Prosecutors Politick: Progressive Law 
Enforcers Then and Now, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 719. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, supra note 9, at 199 (noting that “legislatures could 
permit police to litigate [minor] cases themselves, already a common occurrence in a number 
of jurisdictions”). 
 23 Hal Dardick & John Chase, Foxx Capitalizes on Personal Story, Political Ties in State’s 
Attorney Race, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2016, 6:37 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
politics/ct-kim-foxx-states-attorney-profile-met-20160303-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/VB5P-YRGC]. 
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suggests, bifurcation between progressive and traditional prosecutors is not 
a necessary or even desirable outcome of the progressive prosecution 
movement. Although commentators often describe progressive prosecution 
as a challenge to a traditional prosecutor model, that dichotomy is misleading 
and likely counterproductive. Progressive prosecutors take advantage of the 
fact that there is no consensus about what prosecutors should be doing. True, 
there are prosecutors who leverage the amorphous “duty to do justice” to 
justify penal severity. But there is no reason to accept this as a default 
prosecutorial position. Severity is not an inherent component of the role of 
the American prosecutor. The degree to which it has come to be seen that 
way is simply another symptom of the lack of a normative theory of 
prosecutors. 
Instead of embracing a dichotomous (progressive versus traditional) 
model, scholars could channel the energy of progressive prosecution into an 
updated normative model for all American prosecutors. This model would be 
informed by the seismic changes in the criminal justice system during the 
past few decades. The previous “do justice” vision of the prosecutor arose in 
a time of modest case volume, abundant trials, and broad sentencing 
discretion.24 Now the system is characterized by overwhelming case volume, 
few trials, severe punishment, and mass incarceration.25 Against this new 
backdrop, scholars should seek to identify generalizable principles to guide 
the conversation about what we should expect from today’s prosecutors. 
General principles are critically important because, as Maybell Romero’s 
contribution to this Symposium makes clear, the American prosecutorial 
landscape includes more than just big cities.26 
The core challenge is to craft a normative vision of the prosecutor’s role 
that is distinct from the idea that “prosecutors should do the things that I like.” 
A concrete theory could span rural and urban jurisdictions and time periods. 
It could also reduce inconsistency. By offering an answer to the “why” 
question, a normative theory would help prosecutors and voters figure out 
“what” prosecutors should be doing. 
It is easier to identify flawed theories of the American prosecutor’s role 
than to come up with good ones. For the curious, here is my list of nonviable 
normative theories of prosecution: 
 
 24 Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 19, at 1207, n.22 (describing how “doing 
justice” as the prosecutorial touchstone arose from a 1935 Supreme Court case, with similar 
origins in even earlier sources). 
 25 See Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power, supra note 15, at 835–36, 840, 848 
(describing the rise of mass incarceration, severe sentences, and plea bargaining). 
 26 Maybell Romero, Rural Spaces, Communities of Color, and the Progressive 
Prosecutor, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2020). 
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• Collecting Convictions 
• Implementing the Will of Voters 
• Representing the Victim 
• Representing the Police 
• Abolishing the Criminal Justice System 
• Doing Justice 
• Public Safety 
• Maximizing Severity 
 
I discuss the problems with some of these theories elsewhere, 
specifically: “doing justice,” channeling voter preferences, severity, and 
representing police or victims.27 The other listed theories, apart from public 
safety, have self-evident problems and are rarely seriously invoked as 
generalizable approaches to the prosecutor’s role. I include abolition on the 
nonviable list not because I think abolition itself (however defined) is 
nonviable, but because prosecutors cannot be the source of abolition. To my 
mind, abolition would have to come from those who create the system—
currently judges and legislators—not those who work within it. 
Public safety is increasingly invoked by American prosecutors across 
the ideological spectrum.28 Some prosecutors use the phrase to justify harsh 
policies grounded in penal theories like incapacitation and deterrence.29 More 
recently, progressive prosecutors invoke public safety as a negating 
principle. They reject certain punitive interventions, like lengthy prison 
terms, based on the absence of evidence that these interventions protect the 
public.30 
The problem for public safety-focused prosecutors is twofold. It is 
difficult to determine what course of action promotes public safety. And even 
when that can be determined, it is harder still to utilize the limited tool kit 
prosecutors possess to promote that course of action. When these obstacles 
are overcome, additional problems arise. Will progressive prosecutors really 
 
 27 Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 19, at 1216–20; Bellin, Changing Role, 
supra note 18, at 17–18 
 28 See Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 19, at 1216–20 (surveying landscape of 
prosecutorial invocations of justice and public safety as guiding principle). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id.; see also Bellin, Changing Role, supra note 18, at 10 (“For a long time, people 
critiqued reformers by saying there’s not a proven track record for incarceration alternatives. 
Now, people are asking ‘What’s the evidence that prison works?’ What do we get in return 
for spending all this money on punishment (conservatives), and inflicting all this suffering 
(liberals)?”). 
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embrace harsh polices and conservative prosecutors embrace lenient ones 
when crime trends or empirical research suggests that doing so advances 
public safety? Regardless, even if we can reasonably expect such shifts, a 
public safety approach to prosecution supports a worrying expansion of the 
prosecutor’s role in our society. Each incremental shift (e.g., delivering social 
services through diversion programs, overseeing police activities, monitoring 
polling places) 31 may seem attractive, but these steps continue to enhance 
rather than diminish prosecutorial power. 
What, then, is a viable normative theory of the prosecutorial role? In a 
recent article, “Theories of Prosecution,”32 I explore the possibility of 
conceptualizing the prosecutor as a servant of the law rather than a champion 
of justice or public safety. I take the “servant of the law” label from Berger 
v. United States, the famous Supreme Court case better known for its “do 
justice” directive.33 I use “servant of the law,” as the Court does, to emphasize 
the prosecutor’s obligation to adhere to the protections the system offers the 
accused.34 As Theories of Prosecution explains, the phrase is not intended to 
suggest that prosecutors should “robotically” charge every case that comes 
through the door.35 Another label that perhaps better captures this aspect of 
my proposed normative approach is “caretaker of the criminal justice 
system.” This label reflects the broad range of defendant-protective duties I 
mean to invoke by suggesting that prosecutors should serve the law. 
A caretaker conceptualization mandates unwavering adherence to the 
many constitutional and statutory obligations that apply directly to 
prosecutors. But it goes further. Prosecutors as caretakers would seek to 
facilitate the ability of other actors, such as defense attorneys and judges, to 
 
 31 Kim Foxx’s opening remarks for this Symposium noted that her focus on public safety 
includes embedding prosecutors in local police stations; cf. Cook County State’s Attorney 
Office, Innovative State’s Attorney’s Office Program Results in Dramatic Increase in Repeat 
Gun Charges (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.cookcountystatesattorney.org/news/innovative-
state-s-attorney-s-office-program-results-dramatic-increase-repeat-gun-chargess. 
[https://perma.cc/NAV3-C4BN] (press release promoting “her office’s initiative of taking 
prosecutors out of the courtroom and putting them directly into police districts struggling with 
high rates of gun- violence”); John N. Mitchell, D.A.’s Office Promises Secure Election Day 
Across the City, PHILA. TRIB. (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.phillytrib.com/news/d-a-s-office-
promises-secure-election-day-across-the/article_6588df2f-47b4-54fb-9202-
412654907b87.html [https://perma.cc/YM6A-MX3M]. (discussing progressive prosecutors 
securing polling places). 
 32 Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 19. 
 33 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 34 Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 19, at 1212 (introducing servant of the law 
concept). 
 35 Id. at 1213 (“Importantly, a prosecutor who embraces the servant-of-the-law model 
would not robotically enforce every criminal statute in every case.”). 
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fulfill their constitutional and statutory obligations. Thus, a prosecutor should 
seek to ensure that defense attorneys are able to perform their constitutionally 
mandated roles by providing open file discovery and taking remedial 
measures when defense lawyering is constitutionally ineffective. In a 
caretaker role, prosecutors’ concern with the system’s fairness and 
legitimacy override any desire to obtain convictions or to foster public safety 
and justice. 
In evaluating the caretaker approach, it is important to recognize the 
broad scope of prosecutors’ legal obligations. These obligations are often 
overlooked because of the practical difficulty of proving violations. Problems 
of proof vanish, however, when thinking about normative aspirations. It may 
be difficult to prove that a prosecutor has, for example, exercised a 
peremptory challenge based on race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky.36 But 
a prosecutor who internalizes that obligation will not need a judicial 
corrective. 
A more powerful example can be found in the broader requirements of 
the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.37 
These provisions prohibit charging or plea bargaining based on race. 
Reformers have largely given up on this legal protection due to the difficulty 
of proving a violation.38 But enforcement is not the issue when prosecutors 
internalize constitutional proscriptions. Caretaker prosecutors would work to 
ensure that no violations occur, whether or not challengers could substantiate 
an Equal Protection challenge in court. That means collecting and analyzing 
aggregate charging and plea-bargaining data to ensure that race plays no role. 
One of the primary benefits of the caretaker conception of the 
prosecutor’s role is that it resists framing prosecutors as white knights who 
must be given free rein to deliver justice. A caretaker model emphasizes that 
the criminal justice system is bigger than the prosecutor. (This was part of 
the attraction of the “servant of the law” label.) The caretaker prosecutor’s 
 
 36 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986); see also Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. 
Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or 
Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1093 (2011) (highlighting 
difficulties of proving a Batson violation). 
 37 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“One of these constraints, 
imposed by the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment . . . is that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable 
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’”) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 
368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). 
 38 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) 
(emphasizing that “the standard for proving [selective prosecution claims] is particularly 
demanding, requiring a criminal defendant to introduce ‘clear evidence’ displacing the 
presumption that a prosecutor has acted lawfully”). 
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primary role is to hold the system to its lofty ideals, not to manipulate the 
system to achieve particular outcomes. 
As the preceding discussion suggests, many of the themes of 
progressive prosecutors fit neatly into the caretaker conceptualization, even 
if the rhetoric sounds different.39 An important similarity arises in the desire 
to reduce the number of cases flowing through the system. All prosecutors 
can (and should) reduce the burden on our overloaded system by declining 
and dismissing the many low-severity cases that produce little except misery 
for defendants, witnesses, and victims. Eliminating these cases reduces jail 
overcrowding, incessant court delays, and general strain on the system and 
the folks caught in it. A caretaker would embrace those goals. Exactly how 
to craft dismissal policies is an important question, one that Ron Wright’s 
contribution to the Symposium deftly takes on.40 
Beyond dismissals, both the caretaker prosecutor and the progressive 
prosecutor should eagerly offer lenience when the circumstances warrant. 
Presently, American jurisdictions are characterized by excessive volume and 
severity.41 To combat this penal sprawl, prosecutors should default to 
lenience whenever possible. Doing so would not violate some imagined need 
for prosecutorial severity or the separation of powers. Prosecutors are part of 
a complex system of checks and balances on the State’s power to punish. We 
should worry about prosecutors who accumulate so much power that they 
override other checks and balances, like grand juries, petit juries, and judges. 
But there is far less reason to worry about prosecutorial leniency. Lenience 
is a critical component of prosecutors’ structural role. In addition, elected 
prosecutors will be reluctant to exercise unwarranted leniency in the cases 
that matter, which will typically be cases that matter to voters.42 
As the foregoing suggests, there are good reasons to conceptualize the 
American prosecutor as a caretaker for the criminal justice system, defaulting 
to lenience when that system becomes so congested and punitive that it fails 
to deliver on its constitutional ideals. Doing so generates a variety of benefits. 
It offers the prospect of spinning off generalizable principles that can, in turn, 
 
 39 See Chad Flanders & Stephen Galoob, Progressive Prosecution in a Pandemic, 110 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 685, 692–93 (2020) (describing themes of progressive prosecution). 
 40 Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutors and Their State and Local Polities, 110 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 823 (2020). 
 41 See generally Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power, supra note 15 (describing 
problems of mass incarceration). 
 42 I develop this argument in Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, supra note 9, at 
27–28. 
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be used to craft specific guidelines for concrete action.43 It does not rely on 
ideological labels, allowing adoption (to varying degrees) by reform-minded 
prosecutors regardless of political affiliation. It also does not incentivize 
zealotry or expanding prosecutor power. Finally, folding progressive 
prosecution into a generalizable norm of behavior eliminates the temptation 
to exclude non-ideologically progressive prosecutors or, even worse, push 
those prosecutors toward a severity-focused caricature. 
Even as progressive prosecution remains an ongoing source of reform 
in liberal jurisdictions, it is important to consider the movement’s impact 
outside of those jurisdictions. Nonprogressive prosecutors and the voters who 
elect them are also open to reform.44 But they are not likely to embrace the 
“progressive” label or its accompanying rhetoric. The key to the overall 
success of progressive prosecution in the long run may be to invite these 
prosecutors in and offer them an alternative frame for prosecutor-driven 
reform. A new unifying norm of prosecutorial behavior, better suited to the 
modern era, could turn out to be the most important legacy of progressive 
prosecution. 
 
 43 See generally Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 19 (sketching a framework 
for prosecutorial decision making). 
 44 See generally Bellin, Changing Role, supra note 18 (exploring the appeal of progressive 
prosecution for non-progressive prosecutors). 
